Complex dynamics analysis for a duopoly advertising model with nonlinear cost

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摘要

On the basis of the dynamic cournot game model, we have built the duopoly advertising model with nonlinear cost. On this basis, we point out the stable region of Nash equilibrium and its influencing factors by analyzing the evolution process of the improved model. We discover when enterprise accelerates the adjustment speed of the output quantity in advertisement and increases the market demand of the advertisement unit in order to achieve initial advantage, it leads to instability of systems and makes the systems sink into the chaotic state. In addition, we have pointed out that the makers of chaos definitely cannot gain more advantage than its competitor while entering Chaos.

论文关键词:Advertisement competition,Bounded rationality,Nash equilibrium,Chaos,Duopoly game

论文评审过程:Available online 3 February 2006.

论文官网地址:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2005.11.170