Evolutionary dynamics of the spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma with self-inhibition

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In this paper we study the influence of interventions on self-interactions in a spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma on a two-dimensional grid with periodic boundary conditions and synchronous updating of the dynamics. We investigate two different types of self-interaction modifications. The first type (FSIP) is deterministic, effecting each self-interaction of a player by a constant factor, whereas the second type (PSIP) performs a probabilistic interventions. Both types of interventions lead to a reduction of the payoff of the players and, hence, represent inhibiting effects. We find that a constant but moderate reduction of self-interactions has a very beneficial effect on the evolution of cooperators in the population, whereas probabilistic interventions on self-interactions are in general counter productive for the coexistence of the two different strategies.

论文关键词:Evolutionary dynamics,Evolutionary game theory,Game theory,Prisoner’s dilemma

论文评审过程:Available online 3 January 2012.

论文官网地址:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2011.12.018