A limited mobility of minorities facilitates cooperation in social dilemmas

作者：

Highlights：

• The pure prisoner’s dilemma games is adopted, where parameters are set as: T=b, R=1, P=0 and S=-0.1.

• The alienation from defectors reinforces larger and more compact cooperative clusters. The number of cooperative clusters depend on the viscosity of network, where direct reciprocity works well.

• The concepts of END (the enduring time) and EXP (the expanding time) are used to analyze the dynamic evolution of cooperative clusters. It is shown that large cooperative clusters play key role in shifting from END episode to EXP episode.

• The parameters Dg and Dr are employed to depict the strength of the dilemmas. Thus, we verified what dilemmas are, where the mechanism could still enhance cooperation effectively.

摘要

•The pure prisoner’s dilemma games is adopted, where parameters are set as: T=b, R=1, P=0 and S=-0.1.•The alienation from defectors reinforces larger and more compact cooperative clusters. The number of cooperative clusters depend on the viscosity of network, where direct reciprocity works well.•The concepts of END (the enduring time) and EXP (the expanding time) are used to analyze the dynamic evolution of cooperative clusters. It is shown that large cooperative clusters play key role in shifting from END episode to EXP episode.•The parameters Dg and Dr are employed to depict the strength of the dilemmas. Thus, we verified what dilemmas are, where the mechanism could still enhance cooperation effectively.

论文关键词：Cooperation,Mobility,Alienation,Minority

论文评审过程：Received 14 June 2020, Revised 31 August 2020, Accepted 20 September 2020, Available online 3 October 2020, Version of Record 3 October 2020.

论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2020.125705