Reducing the bystander effect via decreasing group size to solve the collective-risk social dilemma
作者：
Highlights：
• The rate of failure for collective cooperation increases for larger groups, along with the arising of bystander effect and a decrease in average contributions.
• Our experimental observations suggest that bystanders contribute less if others give less contributions.
• More players choose to be bystanders who strategically contribute less when the collective goal is unlikely to achieve, intriguing the failure of collective cooperation.
摘要
•The rate of failure for collective cooperation increases for larger groups, along with the arising of bystander effect and a decrease in average contributions.•Our experimental observations suggest that bystanders contribute less if others give less contributions.•More players choose to be bystanders who strategically contribute less when the collective goal is unlikely to achieve, intriguing the failure of collective cooperation.
论文关键词：Collective cooperation,Bystander effect,Climate change,Risk,Group size,Social dilemma,Games
论文评审过程：Received 8 April 2021, Revised 3 June 2021, Accepted 7 June 2021, Available online 23 June 2021, Version of Record 23 June 2021.
论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2021.126445
