Ability-based asymmetrical fitness calculation promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game

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摘要

We investigate the ability-based fitness calculation in an asymmetric setup to the evolution of cooperation on square lattice. In particular, if players can maintain its strategy for a round, then its abilities will increase 1, otherwise, its ability will turn to 0. We also assume that if players’ abilities exceed a certain threshold M, then its environment is integrated into its fitness calculation via a simple parameter α. Through extensive numerical simulation, we find that large threshold M decreases cooperation, and large α, players’ fitness is mainly decided by its dynamical environment, promotes cooperation. We also provide theoretical analysis and get the same results with simulation. Finally, we test its robustness on homogeneous random network and small-world network. Our work provides a deeper insight to network reciprocity.

论文关键词:Evolutionary dynamics,Ability Prisoner's dilemma game,Social dilemma

论文评审过程:Received 14 April 2021, Revised 28 July 2021, Accepted 29 July 2021, Available online 17 August 2021, Version of Record 17 August 2021.

论文官网地址:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2021.126572