Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees

作者:

摘要

Coalition formation is a key topic in multiagent systems. One may prefer a coalition structure that maximizes the sum of the values of the coalitions, but often the number of coalition structures is too large to allow exhaustive search for the optimal one. Furthermore, finding the optimal coalition structure is NP-complete. But then, can the coalition structure found via a partial search be guaranteed to be within a bound from optimum?

论文关键词:Coalition formation,Anytime algorithm,Multiagent systems,Game theory,Negotiation,Distributed AI,Resource-bounded reasoning

论文评审过程:Received 22 June 1998, Revised 30 March 1999, Available online 24 August 1999.

论文官网地址:https://doi.org/10.1016/S0004-3702(99)00036-3