Voting rules as error-correcting codes

作者:

摘要

We present the first model of optimal voting under adversarial noise. From this viewpoint, voting rules are seen as error-correcting codes: their goal is to correct errors in the input rankings and recover a ranking that is close to the ground truth. We derive worst-case bounds on the relation between the average accuracy of the input votes, and the accuracy of the output ranking. Empirical results from real data show that our approach produces significantly more accurate rankings than alternative approaches.

论文关键词:Social choice,Voting,Ground truth,Adversarial noise,Error-correcting codes

论文评审过程:Received 21 January 2015, Revised 13 October 2015, Accepted 20 October 2015, Available online 27 October 2015, Version of Record 4 November 2015.

论文官网地址:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2015.10.003