How much cost should reciprocators pay in order to distinguish the opponent's cooperation from the opponent's defection?

作者：

Highlights：

• We analyze the iterated simplified prisoner's dilemma game.

• We examine the case where recognizing the opponent's action imposes a perception cost.

• We consider the case where a perception cost depends on a perception level.

• The strategy which pays partial cost can evolve when execution errors are large.

摘要

•We analyze the iterated simplified prisoner's dilemma game.•We examine the case where recognizing the opponent's action imposes a perception cost.•We consider the case where a perception cost depends on a perception level.•The strategy which pays partial cost can evolve when execution errors are large.

论文关键词：Cooperation,Reciprocity,Evolution,Evolutionary game theory,Perception cost,Prisoner's dilemma

论文评审过程：Received 9 January 2018, Revised 30 April 2018, Accepted 5 May 2018, Available online 26 May 2018, Version of Record 26 May 2018.

论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2018.05.010