Evolutionary dynamics of the interdependent security games on complex network
作者：
Highlights：
• We use evolutionary game dynamics to explore the evolution process of three interdependent security games: total effort, weakest link and best shot.
• We use the Monte Carlo method to simulate the specific strategy selection between individuals.
• We carry out simulation experiments in three networks: Lattice networks, Erdos- Renyi (ER) random networks and Barabási-Albert (BA) scale-free networks.
• We study the influence of cluster effects in different networks on the evolution of the three IDS models.
• We provide suggestions and guidance for companies under specific security scenarios in making security investment choices.
摘要
•We use evolutionary game dynamics to explore the evolution process of three interdependent security games: total effort, weakest link and best shot.•We use the Monte Carlo method to simulate the specific strategy selection between individuals.•We carry out simulation experiments in three networks: Lattice networks, Erdos- Renyi (ER) random networks and Barabási-Albert (BA) scale-free networks.•We study the influence of cluster effects in different networks on the evolution of the three IDS models.•We provide suggestions and guidance for companies under specific security scenarios in making security investment choices.
论文关键词：Interdependent security games,Evolutionary game,Complex network
论文评审过程：Received 11 November 2020, Revised 26 January 2021, Accepted 31 January 2021, Available online 10 February 2021, Version of Record 10 February 2021.
论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2021.126051
