Application of strategic fuzzy games to wage increase negotiation and decision problems

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摘要

We propose a flexible decision support scheme which could be used in managing the wage negotiation between employers and employees. This scheme uses fuzzy inference systems and game theory concepts in arriving at decisions on future wage increase which could be more mutually agreeable. For example, rather than specifying 5% yearly increase of wages, we propose that the uncertain factors which are mostly difficult to predict and that could affect wage decisions need to be taken into consideration by the wage formula. These include business revenues or (profit), inflation rate, number of competitors, cost of production, and other uncertain factors that may affect business operations. The accuracy of the fuzzy rule base and the game strategies will help to mitigate the adverse effects that a business may suffer from these uncertain factors. Based on our scheme, we propose that employers and employees should calculate their future wage by using a fuzzy rule base and strategies that take into consideration these uncertain variables. The proposed approach is illustrated with a case study and the procedure and methodology may be easily implemented by business organizations in their wage bargaining and decision processes.

论文关键词:Fuzzy logic,Membership,Functions,Decision,Wage negotiation,Business games,Game theory,Zero sum

论文评审过程:Available online 2 April 2012.

论文官网地址:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2012.03.060