Forgetting as a way to avoid deception in a repeated imitation game

摘要

Adversarial decision making is aimed at determining optimal decision strategies to deal with an adaptive opponent. A clear example of such situation is the repeated imitation game presented here. Two agents compete in an adversarial model where one agent wants to learn how to imitate the actions taken by the other agent by means of the observation and memorization of the past actions. One defense against this adversary is to make decisions that are intended to confuse him. To achieve this, randomized strategies that change along time for one of the agents are proposed and their performance is analysed from both a theoretical and empirical point of view. We also study the ability of the imitator to avoid deception and adapt to a new behaviour by forgetting the oldest observations. The results confirm that wrong assumptions about the imitator’s behaviour lead to dramatic losses due to a failure in causing deception.