Evolutionary games between authors and their editors
作者：
Highlights：
• This paper studies the evolution of manuscript quality control between authors and their editors, using evolutionary games.
• The frequency with which authors and their editors choose to submit/accept high-quality vs low-quality manuscripts change over time in response to the decisions made by all authors and editors in the respective populations.
• Using this dynamical structure, this paper shows which strategies become extinct and which survive, as well as whether the system approaches some stable end-point.
• We explore a number of case studies for editors’ and authors’ beliefs.
• Computer simulations are used to mimic a real world system of authors and their editors.
摘要
•This paper studies the evolution of manuscript quality control between authors and their editors, using evolutionary games.•The frequency with which authors and their editors choose to submit/accept high-quality vs low-quality manuscripts change over time in response to the decisions made by all authors and editors in the respective populations.•Using this dynamical structure, this paper shows which strategies become extinct and which survive, as well as whether the system approaches some stable end-point.•We explore a number of case studies for editors’ and authors’ beliefs.•Computer simulations are used to mimic a real world system of authors and their editors.
论文关键词：Evolutionary games,Peer review,Manuscript quality control,Stable equilibrium,Case study,Computer simulation
论文评审过程：Received 10 September 2015, Revised 7 October 2015, Accepted 12 October 2015, Available online 12 November 2015, Version of Record 12 November 2015.
论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2015.10.034
