Self-adaptive win-stay-lose-shift reference selection mechanism promotes cooperation on a square lattice

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摘要

The preferential reference selection is a new research direction in the evolutionary game theory which provides a paradigmatic framework to study the evolution of cooperation. This paper presents a new reference selection model called self-adaptive win-stay-lose-shift (WSLS) mechanism for strategy updating. Within the proposed reference selection mechanism, the reference model is determined by a self-adaptive way that each individual retains its reference if the receiving payoff does not decline, otherwise switches the reference by randomly selecting a new one from its remaining neighbors. Two social dilemma models, the prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) and public good game (PGG), are utilized to simulate the interactions among individuals and verify the effectiveness of the presented mechanism on square lattices. The simulation results demonstrate that this simple mechanism can evidently increase the cooperation level, which reveals a new means to promote the emergence of cooperation.

论文关键词:Evolutionary game,Win-stay-lose-shift,Reference selection,Prisoner’s dilemma,Public good game,Cooperation

论文评审过程:Received 15 January 2016, Revised 2 March 2016, Accepted 8 March 2016, Available online 6 April 2016, Version of Record 6 April 2016.

论文官网地址:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2016.03.010