Dynamics of a Cournot duopoly game with bounded rationality based on relative profit maximization

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摘要

The dynamics of a Cournot duopoly with relative profits maximizations and costs function with externalities is considered. Results concerning the equilibria of the economic model and their stability are presented and the occurrence of bifurcations is stated. A double route to chaotic dynamics, via flip bifurcations and via Neimark–Sacker bifurcations for game is studied. Numerical experiments are presented.

论文关键词:Cournot game,Relative profit maximization,Boundedly rational players,Nash Equilibrium point,Bifurcation,Chaos

论文评审过程:Received 16 July 2015, Revised 28 August 2016, Accepted 14 September 2016, Available online 29 September 2016, Version of Record 29 September 2016.

论文官网地址:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2016.09.018