Strategy-updating depending on local environment enhances cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma game
作者：
Highlights：
• A new method of strategy updating is proposed in the prisoner’s dilemma game.
• Some players apply the replicator dynamic rule for strategy updating, while the others utilize the comprehensive method.
• The intelligent players would consider not only the neighbor’s payoff but also its environment.
• The results indicate that with the increase of intelligent players, the fraction of cooperation increases.
摘要
•A new method of strategy updating is proposed in the prisoner’s dilemma game.•Some players apply the replicator dynamic rule for strategy updating, while the others utilize the comprehensive method.•The intelligent players would consider not only the neighbor’s payoff but also its environment.•The results indicate that with the increase of intelligent players, the fraction of cooperation increases.
论文关键词：Evolutionary game,Prisoner’s dilemma,Square lattice,Dempster–Shafer evidence theory,Local information
论文评审过程：Received 12 May 2016, Revised 12 December 2016, Accepted 19 December 2016, Available online 6 January 2017, Version of Record 6 January 2017.
论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2016.12.022
