Cleverly handling the donation information can promote cooperation in public goods game

摘要

Since donation list contains a lot of information, the way of dealing with it certainly affects the evolution of cooperation. This paper considers gossip and individuals’ tolerance towards their own self-assessment of face into public goods game and then explore the necessity of publishing the donation list. Subsequently, we try to find a convenient and effective way to set up an optimal threshold for publishing the donation list. Through numerical simulations, results show that publishing the list incompletely can foster cooperation. Moreover, a reasonable threshold can make results better. By contract, we observe that let threshold vary with the mean of the last contributions is the ideal strategy. It is convenient and efficient. Under these circumstances, more money can be raised and the difference between individuals’ donation is also small. What is more, the gossipmongers is not accepted by others when the evolution reaches a steady state. They either cluster together or be isolated.