Cooperation evolves more when players keep the interaction with unknown players
作者：
Highlights：
• We examine the case where players can choose to stop the interaction.
• We examine the case where a player does not always know what the opponent did.
• Cooperation evolves more when players keep the interaction with unknown players.
• Cooperation is more likely to evolve as information on an opponent is more.
• Stopping the interaction with unknown partners is occasionally likely to evolve.
摘要
•We examine the case where players can choose to stop the interaction.•We examine the case where a player does not always know what the opponent did.•Cooperation evolves more when players keep the interaction with unknown players.•Cooperation is more likely to evolve as information on an opponent is more.•Stopping the interaction with unknown partners is occasionally likely to evolve.
论文关键词：
论文评审过程：Received 21 November 2017, Revised 9 April 2018, Accepted 23 December 2018, Available online 19 January 2019, Version of Record 19 January 2019.
论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2018.12.043
