Symmetry breaking in the prisoner’s dilemma on two-layer dynamic multiplex networks

作者：

Highlights：

• Prisoner’s dilemma game played on two-layer dynamic multiplex networks is examined.

• Link updating induces symmetry breaking in cooperation levels across two layers.

• Broken symmetry disappears with sufficiently fast link updating.

• Effects of link updating are more nuanced considering network multiplexity.

摘要

•Prisoner’s dilemma game played on two-layer dynamic multiplex networks is examined.•Link updating induces symmetry breaking in cooperation levels across two layers.•Broken symmetry disappears with sufficiently fast link updating.•Effects of link updating are more nuanced considering network multiplexity.

论文关键词：Evolutionary game theory,Multiplex networks,Dynamic networks,Cooperation,Prisoner’s dilemma

论文评审过程：Received 15 April 2020, Revised 27 June 2020, Accepted 12 July 2020, Available online 22 July 2020, Version of Record 22 July 2020.

论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2020.125543