Effect of collective influence on the evolution of cooperation in evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games
作者：
Highlights：
• The collective influences of individuals are associated with their strategy-updating time scales.
• Mining influential cooperators locating at medium- or small-degrees through the node centrality index of collective influences.
• Those influential cooperators can more efficiently spread their behaviors among neighbors than hubs with large-degrees under the influence of time scale mechanism.
摘要
•The collective influences of individuals are associated with their strategy-updating time scales.•Mining influential cooperators locating at medium- or small-degrees through the node centrality index of collective influences.•Those influential cooperators can more efficiently spread their behaviors among neighbors than hubs with large-degrees under the influence of time scale mechanism.
论文关键词：Scale-free networks,Evolutionary game theory,Collective influence,Time scale
论文评审过程：Received 18 June 2020, Revised 2 September 2020, Accepted 13 September 2020, Available online 5 October 2020, Version of Record 5 October 2020.
论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2020.125679
