On complex dynamics of Cournot-Bertrand game with asymmetric market information
作者：
Highlights：
• A Cournot-Bertrand duopoly game that is characterized as bounded rational firms is introduced by a discrete dynamical map.
• The second firm in the game is characterized by knowing some information about the next time production of its opponent.
• The game’s equilibrium points are calculated and their stability conditions are obtained.
• The stability of Nash point gives rise to periodic and chaotic attractors.
• The structure of basins of attraction for some attracting set changes from simple to complex.
• The critical curves of the map’s game show that it is noninvertible.
摘要
•A Cournot-Bertrand duopoly game that is characterized as bounded rational firms is introduced by a discrete dynamical map.•The second firm in the game is characterized by knowing some information about the next time production of its opponent.•The game’s equilibrium points are calculated and their stability conditions are obtained.•The stability of Nash point gives rise to periodic and chaotic attractors.•The structure of basins of attraction for some attracting set changes from simple to complex.•The critical curves of the map’s game show that it is noninvertible.
论文关键词：Cournot-Bertrand game,Bounded rational firms,Noninvertible map,Bifurcation,Critical curves
论文评审过程：Received 19 August 2020, Revised 14 October 2020, Accepted 12 November 2020, Available online 21 November 2020, Version of Record 21 November 2020.
论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2020.125823
