Average payoff-driven or imitation? A new evidence from evolutionary game theory in finite populations

作者：

Highlights：

• We combined the imitation-driven update rule and the average payoff-driven update rule in the finite populations with positive assortment.

• We studied the evolution of cooperative behavior in one-shot and iterated Prisoner ’s dilemma game.

• The results show that the effectiveness of the average payoff-driven update rule for the promotion of cooperation depends on the reciprocity mechanism.

摘要

•We combined the imitation-driven update rule and the average payoff-driven update rule in the finite populations with positive assortment.•We studied the evolution of cooperative behavior in one-shot and iterated Prisoner ’s dilemma game.•The results show that the effectiveness of the average payoff-driven update rule for the promotion of cooperation depends on the reciprocity mechanism.

论文关键词：Evolutionary game,Finite population,Average payoff-driven,Markov chain,Positive assortment

论文评审过程：Received 27 May 2020, Revised 12 September 2020, Accepted 1 November 2020, Available online 1 December 2020, Version of Record 1 December 2020.

论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2020.125784