Super-rational aspiration induced strategy updating promotes cooperation in the asymmetric prisoner's dilemma game

作者：

Highlights：

• Super-rational aspiration induced strategy updating focuses on satisficing rather than optimizing and doesn't require additional information from the strategic environment.

• Include classic full rationality and symmetry as extreme situations.

• High degrees of super-rationality and asymmetry are more conducive to cooperation.

摘要

•Super-rational aspiration induced strategy updating focuses on satisficing rather than optimizing and doesn't require additional information from the strategic environment.•Include classic full rationality and symmetry as extreme situations.•High degrees of super-rationality and asymmetry are more conducive to cooperation.

论文关键词：Super-rationality,Aspiration,Strategy updating rule,Asymmetry,Prisoner's dilemma

论文评审过程：Received 6 January 2021, Revised 1 March 2021, Accepted 6 March 2021, Available online 19 March 2021, Version of Record 19 March 2021.

论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2021.126180