Mercenary punishment in structured populations
作者：
Highlights：
• In structured populations, we proposed a model with special players that punish defectors.
• Such a policelike or mercenary punishment can be maintained by a tax-based fund.
• If this tax is negligible, a cyclic dominance may emerge among different strategies.
• When this tax is significant then this cyclic dominance solution disappears.
• The maximal average outcome can be reached at an intermediate cost value of punishment.
摘要
•In structured populations, we proposed a model with special players that punish defectors.•Such a policelike or mercenary punishment can be maintained by a tax-based fund.•If this tax is negligible, a cyclic dominance may emerge among different strategies.•When this tax is significant then this cyclic dominance solution disappears.•The maximal average outcome can be reached at an intermediate cost value of punishment.
论文关键词：Cooperation,Public goods game,Punishment
论文评审过程：Received 16 September 2021, Revised 3 November 2021, Accepted 7 November 2021, Available online 23 November 2021, Version of Record 23 November 2021.
论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2021.126797
