Replicator dynamics of the Hawk-Dove game with different stochastic noises in infinite populations

作者：

Highlights：

• The frequency of individuals who adopt D-strategy is related to the number of participants in a population.

• The stability of stochastic dynamics system of N-player Hawk-Dove game is explored.

• The effects of additive noise and multiplicative noise on N-player Hawk-Dove game are very different.

• The persistence of D-strategy is proved by Itô’s formula.

摘要

•The frequency of individuals who adopt D-strategy is related to the number of participants in a population.•The stability of stochastic dynamics system of N-player Hawk-Dove game is explored.•The effects of additive noise and multiplicative noise on N-player Hawk-Dove game are very different.•The persistence of D-strategy is proved by Itô’s formula.

论文关键词：Evolutionary game theory,Hawk-Dove games,Stochastic stability,N-player,Replicator dynamics

论文评审过程：Received 5 April 2022, Revised 16 May 2022, Accepted 18 May 2022, Available online 25 May 2022, Version of Record 25 May 2022.

论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2022.127272