Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in dynamic networked systems with active striving mechanism

作者:

Highlights:

• By constructing linking dynamics, when studying the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation, this paper considers the coevolution of strategy and network structure, so as to explore the cooperative evolution in complex dynamic networked systems.

• For the linking dynamics, different from the traditional random selection of connection objects, this paper proposes a mechanism that individuals can actively recommend themselves before being selected. Through such active efforts, individuals expect to get more opportunities to be connected.

• The individual attributes considered in this paper have two unrelated characteristics. One is strategy, that is, cooperation or defection. They each have their own strength of self recommendation. The other is the high or low response to other people’s self recommendations, which reflects whether individuals are easy to be persuaded.

• In the process of coevolution, a faster increase in the intensity of active striving will dominate the evolutionary competition. The response levels of different types of individuals and their proportion in the system jointly determine whether cooperation emerges. We theoretically analyze the conditions that can promote cooperation when cooperators make self recommendation more actively than defectors.

摘要

•By constructing linking dynamics, when studying the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation, this paper considers the coevolution of strategy and network structure, so as to explore the cooperative evolution in complex dynamic networked systems.•For the linking dynamics, different from the traditional random selection of connection objects, this paper proposes a mechanism that individuals can actively recommend themselves before being selected. Through such active efforts, individuals expect to get more opportunities to be connected.•The individual attributes considered in this paper have two unrelated characteristics. One is strategy, that is, cooperation or defection. They each have their own strength of self recommendation. The other is the high or low response to other people’s self recommendations, which reflects whether individuals are easy to be persuaded.•In the process of coevolution, a faster increase in the intensity of active striving will dominate the evolutionary competition. The response levels of different types of individuals and their proportion in the system jointly determine whether cooperation emerges. We theoretically analyze the conditions that can promote cooperation when cooperators make self recommendation more actively than defectors.

论文关键词:Evolutionary game,Cooperation,Coevolution,Linking dynamics

论文评审过程:Received 25 February 2022, Revised 23 May 2022, Accepted 2 June 2022, Available online 7 June 2022, Version of Record 7 June 2022.

论文官网地址:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2022.127295