Decentralized incentives for general well-being in networked public goods game
作者：
Highlights：
• We derive the dynamical equation under weak selection for networked public goods game with decentralized reward or punishment.
• We obtain the theoretical conditions of the minimally requested amounts of incentives for the expected cooperation level.
• We obtain the optimal decentralized rewarding and punishing incentive schemes.
摘要
•We derive the dynamical equation under weak selection for networked public goods game with decentralized reward or punishment.•We obtain the theoretical conditions of the minimally requested amounts of incentives for the expected cooperation level.•We obtain the optimal decentralized rewarding and punishing incentive schemes.
论文关键词：Cooperation,Evolutionary game theory,Decentralized incentives,Optimal control theory,Pair approximation approach
论文评审过程：Received 25 February 2022, Revised 28 May 2022, Accepted 5 June 2022, Available online 25 June 2022, Version of Record 25 June 2022.
论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2022.127308
