Building trust in online auction markets through an economic incentive mechanism

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摘要

Millions of dollars change hands daily through online auction markets. However, fraud has been on the rise in these markets. Using a game theoretic approach, we propose a design of an economic incentive mechanism, the trusted third party (TTP), to serve the online auction communities. The proposed model addresses both the economic and technological aspects of online auction transactions by assigning a digital certificate to each participant. Thus, each participant's identity as well as his or her reputation can be established by other market participants. The analytical results demonstrate that when online transactions take place with the assistance of digital certificates issued by a TTP, the most utilitarian course of action for a market participant is to behave honestly.

论文关键词:Electronic commerce,Electronic markets,Online auction,Trusted third party,Certification authority,Digital certificate,Trust,Game theory

论文评审过程:Accepted 31 March 2002, Available online 7 May 2002.

论文官网地址:https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-9236(02)00074-X