Bayesian Stackelberg games for cyber-security decision support

作者:

Highlights:

• A cyber-security decision support system to select an optimal security portfolio to counteract multistage cyber-attacks.

• The system has both preventive and online optimizations supported by a learning mechanism to detect ongoing attacks.

• The online optimization is shown to be a Bayesian Stackelberg game for which efficient solutions are introduced.

摘要

A decision support system for cyber-security is here presented. The system aims to select an optimal portfolio of security controls to counteract multi-stage attacks. The system has several components: a preventive optimisation to select controls for an initial defensive portfolio, a learning mechanism to estimate possible ongoing attacks, and an online optimisation selecting an optimal portfolio to counteract ongoing attacks. The system relies on efficient solutions of bi-level optimisations, in particular, the online optimisation is shown to be a Bayesian Stackelberg game solution. The proposed solution is shown to be more efficient than both classical solutions like Harsanyi transformation and more recent efficient solvers. Moreover, the proposed solution provides significant security improvements on mitigating ongoing attacks compared to previous approaches. The novel techniques here introduced rely on recent advances in Mixed-Integer Conic Programming (MICP), strong duality and totally unimodular matrices.

论文关键词:Attack graphs,Bayesian Stackelberg games,Cyber-security,Security games,Security investment

论文评审过程:Received 7 January 2021, Revised 12 May 2021, Accepted 12 May 2021, Available online 15 May 2021, Version of Record 7 July 2021.

论文官网地址:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2021.113599