Optimal insurance contract design with “No-claim Bonus and Coverage Upper Bound” under moral hazard

作者：

Highlights：

• The paper creates a new contract with “No-claim Bonus and Coverage Upper Bound”

• Analyze the welfare increase brought by the suppression of moral hazard.

• A sufficient condition is given to describe the condition of application.

• Two cases are used to demonstrate Pareto improvement of the new contract.

摘要

•The paper creates a new contract with “No-claim Bonus and Coverage Upper Bound”•Analyze the welfare increase brought by the suppression of moral hazard.•A sufficient condition is given to describe the condition of application.•Two cases are used to demonstrate Pareto improvement of the new contract.

论文关键词：Moral hazard,No-claim bonus,Coverage upper bound,Insurance contract design

论文评审过程：Received 29 July 2020, Revised 11 January 2021, Accepted 14 April 2021, Available online 19 April 2021, Version of Record 29 April 2021.

论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2021.115050