Optimal shipping policy in retail competition and its effect on customers
作者:
Highlights:
• Free shipping benefits low-priced retailers, while calculated shipping benefits high-priced retailers.
• Any increase in the shipping fee will hurt the upstream supplier, but under some particular circumstances, it will benefit the downstream retailers.
• Equilibrium shipping strategies are Pareto-optimal for online retailers and their upstream supplier.
• The equilibrium shipping strategies could bring the highest social welfare to the society, but cannot bring the highest consumer welfare to customers.
摘要
•Free shipping benefits low-priced retailers, while calculated shipping benefits high-priced retailers.•Any increase in the shipping fee will hurt the upstream supplier, but under some particular circumstances, it will benefit the downstream retailers.•Equilibrium shipping strategies are Pareto-optimal for online retailers and their upstream supplier.•The equilibrium shipping strategies could bring the highest social welfare to the society, but cannot bring the highest consumer welfare to customers.
论文关键词:Free shipping policy,Calculated shipping policy,Game theory,Supply chain,Retail competition
论文评审过程:Received 22 June 2020, Revised 10 October 2020, Accepted 24 November 2020, Available online 28 November 2020, Version of Record 21 December 2020.
论文官网地址:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.elerap.2020.101020