Online hybrid Dutch auction approach for selling toxic assets under asymmetric bidders and the possibility of collusion
作者：
Highlights：
• First attempt in modeling Hybrid Dutch Auction (HDA) for online selling of NPLs.
• Equilibria are derived via backward induction in the symmetric and asymmetric cases.
• We found that bidding in the third stage by the Dutch winner favors the seller.
• Results indicate the HDA outperforms five of the best popular auctions.
• The HDA leads to more competition, higher revenues, and lower variances.
摘要
•First attempt in modeling Hybrid Dutch Auction (HDA) for online selling of NPLs.•Equilibria are derived via backward induction in the symmetric and asymmetric cases.•We found that bidding in the third stage by the Dutch winner favors the seller.•Results indicate the HDA outperforms five of the best popular auctions.•The HDA leads to more competition, higher revenues, and lower variances.
论文关键词：Online auctions,Backward induction,Toxic assets,non-performing loans (NPLs),Asymmetric bidders,Collusion,Standard auctions,Optimal auction,Amsterdam auction,Mechanism design
论文评审过程：Received 29 July 2021, Revised 11 March 2022, Accepted 17 March 2022, Available online 21 March 2022, Version of Record 31 March 2022.
论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.elerap.2022.101142
