A novel electronic cash system with trustee-based anonymity revocation from pairing

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摘要

Untraceable electronic cash is an attractive payment tool for electronic-commerce because its anonymity property can ensure the privacy of payers. However, this anonymity property is easily abused by criminals. In this paper, several recent untraceable e-cash systems are examined. Most of these provide identity revealing only when the e-cash is double spent. Only two of these systems can disclose the identity whenever there is a need, and only these two systems can prevent crime. We propose a novel e-cash system based on identity-based bilinear pairing to create an anonymity revocation function. We construct an identity-based blind signature scheme, in which a bank can blindly sign on a message containing a trustee-approved token that includes the user’s identity. On demand, the trustee can disclose the identity for e-cash using only one symmetric operation. Our scheme is the first attempt to incorporate mutual authentication and key agreement into e-cash protocols. This allows the proposed system to attain improvement in communication efficiency when compared to previous works.

论文关键词:Anonymity revocation,Bilinear pairing,E-cash,Digital cryptography,Mutual authentication

论文评审过程:Received 11 July 2009, Revised 3 June 2011, Accepted 3 June 2011, Available online 21 June 2011.

论文官网地址:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.elerap.2011.06.002