Online double auction mechanism for perishable goods

作者：

Highlights：

• We investigate mechanism design for a spot market of perishable goods.

• We explain that failures of trading in the perishable goods damage social utility.

• We develop an online double auction that prioritizes time-critical bids.

• Multiagent simulations show the auction realizes efficient and fair allocations.

摘要

•We investigate mechanism design for a spot market of perishable goods.•We explain that failures of trading in the perishable goods damage social utility.•We develop an online double auction that prioritizes time-critical bids.•Multiagent simulations show the auction realizes efficient and fair allocations.

论文关键词：Market design,Online double auction,Perishable goods,Multi-agent simulation

论文评审过程：Received 11 December 2013, Revised 17 June 2014, Accepted 18 June 2014, Available online 26 June 2014.

论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.elerap.2014.06.004