On the efficacy of imperfect public-monitoring of seller reputation in e-commerce
作者：
Highlights：
• The main objective is the empirical study of e-transactions for the formation of buyers’ beliefs.
• Theoretical analysis of reputation in on line transactions is presented in terms of game theory.
• A game with imperfect public monitoring and adverse selection is detailed.
• Empirical evidence on the determinants of perceived buyers’ reputation of virtual shops is shown.
• Web buyers consider both advertising and social signals to learn seller’s characteristics.
摘要
•The main objective is the empirical study of e-transactions for the formation of buyers’ beliefs.•Theoretical analysis of reputation in on line transactions is presented in terms of game theory.•A game with imperfect public monitoring and adverse selection is detailed.•Empirical evidence on the determinants of perceived buyers’ reputation of virtual shops is shown.•Web buyers consider both advertising and social signals to learn seller’s characteristics.
论文关键词：C7,C25,L2,L81,E-commerce,Empirical research,Game theory,Online selling,Modeling research,Monitoring technologies,Probit model,Reputation games
论文评审过程：Received 24 November 2014, Revised 25 November 2014, Accepted 25 November 2014, Available online 1 December 2014.
论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.elerap.2014.11.005
