Bidding strategies in online auctions with different ending rules and value assumptions

作者：

Highlights：

• We divide the auction process into two stages and then use backward induction to study various online auctions.

• In second-price online auctions it is dominant to report true value for all customers.

• That when to bid is independent of hard-close and soft-close for first-price online auctions under PV.

• Late bidding is dominant under CV, but only in first-price online auctions with hard-close under PV.

摘要

•We divide the auction process into two stages and then use backward induction to study various online auctions.•In second-price online auctions it is dominant to report true value for all customers.•That when to bid is independent of hard-close and soft-close for first-price online auctions under PV.•Late bidding is dominant under CV, but only in first-price online auctions with hard-close under PV.

论文关键词：Online auctions,Ending rule,Late bidding,Private value,Common value,Backward induction

论文评审过程：Received 7 August 2014, Revised 5 December 2014, Accepted 11 December 2014, Available online 20 December 2014.

论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.elerap.2014.12.002