A coordination mechanism for optimizing the contingent-free shipping threshold in online retailing
作者：
Highlights：
• We modeled the design of free shipping threshold as a sequential Stackelberg game.
• The equilibrium solutions of the game theoretically have been derived.
• We proposed modified quantity discount contacts for the supply chain coordination.
• A simulation experiment has been conducted to validate the theoretical derivations.
摘要
•We modeled the design of free shipping threshold as a sequential Stackelberg game.•The equilibrium solutions of the game theoretically have been derived.•We proposed modified quantity discount contacts for the supply chain coordination.•A simulation experiment has been conducted to validate the theoretical derivations.
论文关键词：Contingent-free-shipping,Coordination mechanism,Quantity discount contract,Stackelberg model,Supply chain
论文评审过程：Received 22 April 2016, Revised 2 October 2017, Accepted 2 October 2017, Available online 5 October 2017, Version of Record 13 October 2017.
论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.elerap.2017.10.001
