The side with larger network externality should be targeted aggressively? Monopoly pricing, reference price and two-sided markets
作者：
Highlights：
• This paper highlights the pricing strategy in two-sided markets with the reference price effect under monopoly structure.
• The reference price effect on one side also has influence on pricing strategy on another side due to the existence of cross-group network externality.
• When the reference price is exogenous, we find that the group that has larger network externality may not be targeted aggressively as the conventional conclusion shows.
• When the utility function increases and then decreases with respect to the reference price effect, the optimal reference price is a fixed value above the membership fee.
摘要
•This paper highlights the pricing strategy in two-sided markets with the reference price effect under monopoly structure.•The reference price effect on one side also has influence on pricing strategy on another side due to the existence of cross-group network externality.•When the reference price is exogenous, we find that the group that has larger network externality may not be targeted aggressively as the conventional conclusion shows.•When the utility function increases and then decreases with respect to the reference price effect, the optimal reference price is a fixed value above the membership fee.
论文关键词：Reference price effect,Two-sided markets,Monopoly structure,Cross-group network externality
论文评审过程：Received 2 April 2019, Revised 3 May 2020, Accepted 10 July 2020, Available online 21 July 2020, Version of Record 4 August 2020.
论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.elerap.2020.100995
